China, as of 2022, is on a trajectory to possess over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, with many of these deployed at higher readiness levels. This nuclear force is expected to continue growing until 2035, aligning with its objective of completing the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by that year, according to the latest report of the US Department of Defense (DoD). This marks a crucial milestone toward President Xi Jinping’s goal of establishing a “world-class” military by 2049.
The Department of Defense released its annual report on the “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” known as the China Military Power Report (CMPR), on Oct. 19, 2023.
In 2022, Beijing sustained its rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) estimated that by May 2023, China had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads, surpassing previous projections. The PRC is likely to utilize its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, even though it publicly maintains that these technologies are intended for peaceful purposes.
A notable development in 2022 was the completion of three new solid-propellant silo fields, which comprise at least 300 new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos. Some ICBMs have been loaded into these silos. This project, combined with the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force, is intended to enhance the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force, moving it toward a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.
China has also introduced the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fuelled ICBM equipped with a nuclear warhead boasting a multi-megaton yield. Additionally, the PRC has deployed the longer-range JL-3 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) on its current JIN class Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), enabling these vessels to cover the continental United States from Chinese littoral waters.
China’s nuclear expansion and modernization efforts represent a significant shift in its strategic capabilities, raising concerns and implications in the realm of global security and strategic balance.
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY
In 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintained its defence policy, which is cantered on safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing an expanded global role. The core of the PRC’s military strategy continues to be based on the principle of “active defence.” PRC leaders have consistently underscored the necessity of transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class” military by the year 2049. This transformation is viewed as a crucial component of the broader strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”
In October 2022, Xi Jinping secured his third term as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Party Congress. His appointment of loyalists to top positions within the Central Military Commission (CMC) is expected to facilitate further advancements in military modernization and operational goals during his upcoming 5-year term.
In 2022, the PLA initiated discussions about a novel “core operational concept” known as “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare.” This concept is designed to harness a C4ISR network that incorporates cutting-edge technologies like big data and artificial intelligence. Its primary aim is to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities within the U.S. operational system and, in response, utilize joint forces across various domains to launch precision strikes against these vulnerabilities.
FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on a path of modernization, focusing on enhancing its capabilities across all warfare domains. The objective is to enable the PLA to operate effectively in land, air, maritime, nuclear, space, counter space, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations as a joint force.
China’s evolving military capabilities and strategies are aimed at bolstering its capacity to “fight and win wars,” particularly against perceived strong adversaries, which is commonly understood to refer to the United States. Additionally, these capabilities enable China to counter any third-party interventions in conflicts along its periphery and extend its global power projection.
Key highlights of China’s military branches and their developments in 2022 include:
1. People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA): The PLAA continues to modernize its equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training. Notably, the PLAA showcased a new long-range fire capability during its response to a U.S. Congressional Delegation visit to Taiwan in August 2022.
2. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN): With over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants, the PLAN ranks as the world’s largest navy. It predominantly comprises modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier and commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA), enhancing its long-range precision strike capabilities.
3. People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation: Combined, the PLAAF and PLAN aviation constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces by modernizing its aircraft fleet and integrating various unmanned aircraft systems.
4. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF): The PLARF is dedicated to modernizing its long-term capabilities for “strategic deterrence.” This includes developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhancing nuclear warhead production to accommodate multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
5. Strategic Support Force (SSF): The SSF centralizes strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. It’s actively developing counter space capabilities to contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain.
6. Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF): The JLSF is focused on enhancing joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services, facilitating the movement of PLA forces and equipment.
7. Special Operations Forces (SOF): China’s SOF units lack real-world combat experience despite training. There’s a lack of a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities, and theatre commanders have limited authority over People’s Armed Police (PAP) units, which makes integrating PAP SOF into PLA training exercises challenging.
China’s ongoing modernization efforts aim to bolster its military capabilities and enhance its global influence, enabling it to address various security and strategic concerns effectively.
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION
China’s counter-intervention strategy is designed to curtail the United States’ presence in the East and South China Sea regions, primarily focusing on the First Island Chain (FIC), while simultaneously aiming to deter U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific area.
Key elements of China’s counter-intervention strategy include:
1. Long-Range Precision Strike and ISR: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) underscores the importance of precision attacks across all warfare domains in modern warfare. Precision weapons are viewed as not only force multipliers but also tools for “war control,” allowing for de-escalation.
2. Integrated Air Defence System (IADS): China has established a robust and redundant IADS architecture covering land areas and extending up to 300 nautical miles from its coast. This system relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and various surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Additionally, China has placed radars and air defence assets on outposts in the South China Sea, further expanding the reach of its IADS.
3. Hypersonic Weapons: China’s deployment of the DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)-armed Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) is set to bring transformative capabilities to the PLA’s missile force. This system is potentially intended to replace some older Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) units and is specifically designed to target foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, as indicated by military experts based in China.
China’s counter-intervention strategy and the development of advanced military capabilities reflect its efforts to assert regional dominance and protect its interests in key strategic areas.
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY
China’s national strategy, aimed at achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, is a determined effort to modernize politically, socially, and militarily. The goal is to enhance China’s national power, perfect its governance, and reshape the international order to support China’s system of governance and national interests. From China’s perspective, the United States is perceived as actively working to curb China’s rise, creating hurdles for its national strategy.
China characterizes its view of strategic competition as a rivalry among powerful nation-states and a clash of opposing ideological systems. Chinese leaders attribute the growing strategic competition with the United States to structural changes in the international system and a confrontational stance from the U.S. In March 2023, Xi Jinping expressed that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement, and suppression against us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”
China’s strategy involves deliberate and resolute efforts to accumulate, enhance, and leverage internal and external elements of national power to position China as a leader in a sustained competition among different systems. In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent global environment, emphasizing that it has “strengthened” China’s security on all fronts and has successfully navigated political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.
FOREIGN POLICY
China’s foreign policy is driven by the goal of creating a “community of common destiny” that aligns with its strategy to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This ambition to reshape the international order stems from the core objectives of China’s national strategy and the principles embedded in the Party’s political and governing systems.
Starting in late 2022, Beijing initiated a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ primarily directed at European nations. This move appeared to be an attempt to improve Beijing’s image after a period characterized by assertive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and global isolation stemming from the COVID pandemic.
In April 2022, President Xi Jinping introduced the Global Security Initiative (GSI), following the previous year’s launch of the Global Development Initiative (GDI). China has actively promoted the GSI and has endeavoured to incorporate GSI-related language into various multilateral forums and documents.
The unexpected conflict in Ukraine due to Russia’s actions in February 2022 posed a significant challenge for China. As Beijing contemplates the extent of its material support for Russia in this conflict, it will likely seek to strike a balance between its strategic partnership with Russia and concerns about the potential reputational or economic costs associated with such assistance.
ECONOMIC POLICY
At the close of 2022, China made a surprising shift by reversing its zero-COVID policy. This decision to reopen the country caught many off guard and was likely prompted by widespread protests against China’s strict zero-COVID measures, economic pressures, and fiscal challenges faced by local governments.
The 20th Party Congress underscored the significance of pursuing quality growth over rapid growth in China’s economy. General Secretary Xi Jinping also emphasized the concept of “common prosperity,” aiming for more equitable access to essential public services, the establishment of a robust multi-tiered social security system, and a commitment to cultural and environmentally sustainable development as key economic initiatives.
China’s ongoing military modernization objectives are closely tied to its broader national development goals, reflecting the country’s aspirations for both economic and defence advancements.
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) places significant emphasis on achieving space superiority, which entails the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and prevent adversaries from utilizing their space-based information-gathering and communication capabilities. This capacity is deemed essential for conducting modern “informatized warfare.”
Key elements of China’s space strategy and capabilities include:
1. Space-Based ISR and Communication: The PLA continues to invest in enhancing its space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This encompasses satellite communication, satellite navigation, meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration.
2. Counter space Capabilities: China is actively acquiring and developing various counter space capabilities and related technologies. These include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots, and expanded space surveillance capabilities. The surveillance capabilities enable monitoring of objects in space within their field of view and empower counter space actions.
China’s pursuit of space superiority and counter space capabilities underscores its commitment to achieving a dominant position in space, aligning with its broader military modernization efforts. This has significant implications for its ability to control the information sphere and defend its interests in an increasingly interconnected world.
